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I. Introduction
In the aftermath of the six-day war, Israel embarked in an ambitious course aimed at developing "high-tech" industries, as a means to exploit its perceived comparative advantage in world-class academic resources and highly skilled labor (contrasted to its relatively poor endowment in natural resources). The government undertook to actively support industrial R&D aimed primarily at export markets, in addition to harnessing the spillovers from a sophisticated defense R&D sector. And indeed, the last two decades have seen a surge of activity in high tech fields in Israel, ranging f rom computer software to communications equipment to advanced medical devices to biotechnology.
As a consequence, Israel is widely regarded as one of the few Silicon Valley type of technology centers outside the US, and has turned into an attractive location for R&D operations of leading multinationals.
We intend in this paper to provide a close-up portrait of the israeli high tech sector with the aid of highly detailed patent data, drawn from all patents granted in the US to israeli inventors, and to US patents granted to other countries. We shall address questions such as: How does Israel fare vis a vis other countries in terms of patenting activity?
What is the technological composition of its innovations? Who actually owns the intellectual property rights, and to what extent can the local economy expect to benefit from the innovations done by israeli inventors? How do israeli innovations compare to those of other countries in terms of their "importance" as reflected in patent citations? In addressing these questions we hope not only to shed light on the case of Israel, but also to demonstrate the power of this type of data for studying innovation in great detail and, in particular, for examining in a comparative fashion the innovative performance of countries and regions.
The reason for focusing on israeli-held patents granted in the US is clear: if innovations are pursued primarily for export, it is the property rights in the target countries that have to be protected. True, Israel exports a great deal also to Europe, but it is usually the case that patents are sought first and foremost in the US (where the standards for patentability are more stringent that in most european countries).
1 Thus, one can hopefully learn a great deal about export-oriented technologies by analyzing the israeli patents granted in the US. From the early 1960s through 1998 Israel-based inventors received about 7,000 patents in the US. This is a large (absolute) number, and it placed Israel as the 14th largest foreign recipient of US patents, ahead of some OECD countries such as Norway and Spain.
Adam Jaffe and I have developed in recent years a methodological approach that allows one to study innovation in great detail with the aid of patent data, and not just to rely on patent counts. 2 In particular, building both on detailed information contained in patents and on patent citations, we can compute for each individual patent quantitative indicators of notions such as the "importance", "generality", and "originality" of patents (see Trajtenberg, Jaffe and Henderson, 1997) . We can also trace the "spillovers"
stemming from each patent, and analyze their geographical and temporal patterns (e.g.
are spillovers geographically localized? see Jaffe, Henderson and Trajtenberg, 1993) .
Moreover, we have constructed a large data bank containing information on all US patents granted from 1965 to 1996, 3 that allows us to compute this sort of measures for any subset of patents. This is a powerful capability that greatly enhances our ability to do empirical research in the area of the Economics of Technical Change.
The paper is organized as follows: beginning with a concise discussion of the data in section II, we then examine in sections III and IV the main trends in israeli patenting, both in itself and in comparison to three groups of countries: the G7, a group of countries with GDP per capita similar to Israel (Finland, Spain, Ireland and New Zealand) , and the "Asian Tigers" (Taiwan, South Korean, Hong Kong and Singapore). Section V deals with the technological composition of israeli innovations, relative to that of the US. In section VI we look in detail at the distribution of israeli assignees, in an attempt to elucidate the all important issue of who really controls the rights to the intellectual property embedded 1 In any case, casual evidence indicates that there is a strong correlation between patenting in the US and patenting in Europe. 2 Rebecca Henderson of MIT also participated in the initial stages of this endeavor, and Bronwyn Hall of Berkeley and Oxford has been involved in it for the past few years. 3 With the assistance of Michael Fogarty and his team at Case Western University.
in these patents, and hence who can expect to benefit from it. Section VII undertakes to examine the relative "importance" or "quality" of israeli patents vis a vis other countries, in terms of citations received. Section VIII offers concluding remarks.
II. Data
A patent is a temporary monopoly awarded to inventors for the commercial use of a newly invented device. For a patent to be granted, the innovation must be non-trivial, meaning that it would not appear obvious to a skilled practitioner of the relevant technology, and it must be useful, meaning that it has potential commercial value. If a patent is granted, an extensive public document is created. The front page of a patent contains detailed information about the invention, the inventor, the assignee, and the technological antecedents of the invention, all of which can be accessed in computerized form (see Figure 1 ).
[Figure 1 -about here]
These extremely detailed and rich data have, however, two important limitations:
first, the range of patentable innovations constitutes just a sub-set of all research outcomes, and second, patenting is a strategic decision and hence not all patentable innovations are actually patented. As to the first limitation, consider an hypothetical distribution of research outcomes, ranging from the most applied on the left to the most basic on the right. Clearly, neither end of the continuum is patentable: Maxwell's equations could not be patented since they do not constitute a device (ideas cannot be patented). On the other hand, a marginally better mousetrap is not patentable either, because the innovation has to be non-trivial. Thus, our measures would not capture purely scientific advances devoid of immediate applicability, as well as run-of-the-mill technological improvements that are too trite to pass for discrete, codifiable innovations.
The second limitation is rooted in the fact that it may be optimal for inventors not to apply for patents even though their innovations would satisfy the criteria for patentability.
For example, until 1980 universities in the USA could not collect royalties for the use of patents derived from federally funded research. This limitation greatly reduced the incentive to patent results from such research, which constitutes about 90% of all university research in the USA. Firms, on the other hand, may elect not to patent and rely instead on secrecy to protect their property rights. 4 Thus, patentability requirements and incentives to refrain from patenting limit the scope of analysis based on patent data. It is widely believed that these limitations are not too severe, but that remains an open empirical issue.
Our working hypothesis here is that, whereas these limitations may affect level comparisons across fields/industries and perhaps also across countries at a point in time, they do not affect the analysis of trends and changes over time. In other words, if we observe for example a big surge in the share of israeli patents in the field of Computers and Communications and a concomitant decline in the share of Chemicals, it is hard to believe that these changes are due to underlying changes in the relative propensity to patent in these two sectors. Rather, the assumption is that these trends reflect true changes in the amount of innovation done in those fields.
The data that we use here were assembled from various sources. First, from our own massive data bank, which consists as said of all US patents and their citations, granted form 1965 through 1996, we extracted the following subsets: (1) all patents granted during that period to Israel, to the 4 countries in the Reference Group (Finland, Ireland, New Zealand and Spain) , and a random sample of 1/72 of US patents; (2) for all those patents (over 30,000) we added all the patent citations that they received over the same period (about 110,000); (3) patent counts by application year for all the other comparison countries (the G7 and the Asian Tigers). Second, we extracted from the US Patent Office site in the Internet, all israeli patents granted in 1997 (up to December 15, 1998 . 5 Third, we extracted from a related site data on "raw applications" for all these countries. We then added data on population for the comparison countries and Israel, data on R&D for the G7, and a variety of other data from the NSF and other sources. Figure 2 shows the number of successful israeli patent applications in the US over time, starting in 1968. 6 The growth in the annual number of patents has been very impressive, starting from about 50 in the late sixties, to over 600 in the late 1990's (i.e.
III. Basic facts about israeli patenting in the US
they grew by a factor of 12). However, as generate by itself the required future growth, but that remains to be seen. Table 1 shows also the number of "raw applications", that is, the overall number of patent applied for in the USA by israeli inventors. Of these, only those under "patents issued, by application year" (which is the figure we shall use all along) were actually granted, the rest did not pass the rather stringent tests of the US Patent Office (novelty, usefulness, etc.). The average "success rate" over the whole period was of 54%, with no clear trend over time (except for the fact that it was clearly higher in the first decade, 1968-77). We shall return to t his datum in the context of international comparisons, but it is worth pointing out now that a 54% success rate suggests that there are margins for improvements even within this (narrow) context. That is, close to half of the innovations that were good enough to merit a costly application to the US Patent Office, 9 do not seem to bear fruit, in the sense that are not worthy of a US patent. Perhaps there is room for low-cost policies/actions that would target the R&D efforts underlying the unsuccessful 46% and channel them into more fruitful directions.
9 That constitutes already a high standard.
IV. International Comparisons
Whereas the detailed analysis of Israeli patenting is revealing in itself (as we shall see in subsequent sections), we resort to international comparisons in order to put in perspective the overall level and trend over time in Israeli patenting. We have chosen for that purpose 3 different groups of countries, as follows:
1. The G7: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and USA.
2. A "Reference Group": Finland, Ireland, New Zealand and Spain.
3. The "Asian Tigers": Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.
The Reference Group was chosen according to their GDP per capita in the early 1990's, that is, we chose the 4 countries that had at that time a level of GDP per capita closest to that of Israel (in ppp terms). Notice that, except for Spain, the other 3 countries in this group are very similar to Israel also in terms of population.
Appendix 1 contains detailed patent figures for each country, and Figures 4 -6
show the time patterns of patents per capita for Israel versus each of the above groups of countries. We chose to normalize the number of patents by population, simply because this is a widely available and accurate statistic that provides a consistent scale factor.
Another normalization of interest would be R&D expenditures, but except for the G7, the figures for the other countries are far from satisfactory. Figure 4 reveals that Israel started virtually at the bottom of the G7 (together with Italy), but by 1987 it had climbed ahead of Italy, UK, and France and was in par with Canada. In the early-mid nineties it moved ahead of Canada and (the unified) Germany, 10 thus becoming 3d after the USA and Japan. Using civilian R&D as deflator for these countries show a similar result. Thus, there is no question that Israel had surged forward and placed itself in the forefront of technological advanced countries, at least in terms of (normalized) numbers of patents. It is interesting to note also that, other than Israel, the only country that grew all along since 1970 was Japan. The others were either stagnant or declined (as the USA did) until the early 1980s. The fact that 1983 proved to be a turning point for all of the largest countries 10 Had Germany remained divided, Israel would probably reach parity with west Germany by 1998-99.
at the same time (USA, Japan, Germany, and t o a lesser extent also for Canada) is interesting in itself, but remains to be explained.
[Figures 4, 5 & 6 -about here]
The comparison with the Reference Group shows a very clear picture: the only country that is "game" is Finland, which has followed a pattern virtually identical to Israel, both in levels and in the timing of fluctuations (this striking resemblance deserves further scrutiny -see below). The other 3 countries are well behind, and have remained at the bottom without any significant changes over time. The one surprise there is Ireland, which has pursued for over a decade active policies to attract foreign investments in advanced technologies. As to the Asian Tigers, we can see immediately that Taiwan has grown extremely rapidly since the early eighties, actually surpassing Israel as of 1997.
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And indeed, Taiwan is widely regarded today as a High Tech powerhouse, after being associated with low-tech, imitative behavior for a long time. South Korea seems to be embarked on a similar path. By contrast, Hong Kong and Singapore remain well behind.
For all their limitations, these comparisons correspond quite well to what we know about these countries, only that this way we get a much more detailed and precise picture of the underlying trends. The observed patterns for Finland, Ireland and Taiwan are particularly revealing, and exemplify the power of patent statistics to uncover phenomena that otherwise are hard to detect. Table 2 summarizes the main statistics for all these countries, including t heir "success rates" and growth rates in patenting, over the whole period and for the past 5 years. Notice that, in terms of recent patents per capita, Israel stands third after the USA and Japan, in comparison to all the 15 countries, and in terms of growth rates it also ranks third, after South Korea, Taiwan and New Zealand (the latter not yet an important player). This is no doubt a remarkable achievement. The picture is less flattering in terms of success rates: Israel ranks 8 th , after most G7 countries, Finland and South Korea. The average for those countries ahead of Israel is 61%; if Israel were able to reach this mark from the present 56%, that would represent an increase of about 10% in the annual number of patents granted. This would be l ike an increase in the productivity of the R&D process, rather than an increase in the overall level of resources devoted to inventive activity. As to growth rates, Israel grew faster than both the G7 and the reference group over the whole period, with wide fluctuations in growth rates over time. The Asian Tigers display much higher rates, but we have to remember that they started from very low levels, and hence these rates should be seen primarily as "catch up".
[ Table 2 -about here]
Lastly, it is important to note that in the present context the absolute number of patents remains key (similarly to the absolute level of R&D expenditures, rather than its ratio to GDP). In order to establish a viable, self-sustaining High Tech sector, a country has to achieve a critical mass in terms of pertinent infrastructure, skills development, managerial experience, testing facilities, marketing and communication channels, financial institutions, etc. Similarly, it is clear by now that spillovers, and in particular regional spillovers, are extremely important in fueling the growth of this sector. Once again, the amount of spillovers generated, and the ability to capture external spillovers is a function of absolute, not relative size. If we take the number of patents as i ndicative of the absolute size of the innovative sector, then Israel has still a long way to go: it stands well below all the G7 countries, and is about ¼ the size of Taiwan and South Korea. In order to get to the (absolute) level as of today of say the lower tier G7 countries (Canada, France, UK) and the leading Asian Tigers (Taiwan and South Korea), israeli patenting would have to grow at a rate of about 30% per year over the next 5 years! At present growth rates (of 13.3% per year), it would take 10 years to get there. That's too long, by all accounts.
V. The Technological Composition of Israeli Patented Innovations
The US Patent Office has developed over the years a very elaborate classification system by which it assigns patents to technological categories. According to the conventions of the US Patent Office, the "nationality" of a patent is determined by the address (at the time of application) of the first inventor. That is, if a patent has many inventors and they are located in a variety of countries, the location of the first inventor listed on the patent determines to which country it is deemed to belong. Likewise, if the assignee is located in a country different from that of the first inventor, it is once again the location of the latter that determines the nationality of the patent. Thus, in the patent shown on Figure 1 , the first inventor has an israeli address, whereas the other three inventors listed have addresses in the USA, and the patent was assigned to Intel Co. of Santa Clara, CA; nevertheless, the patent is formally classified as israeli.
14 The data that we have presented so far (e.g. number of patents by countries) were compiled according to this convention: Israeli patents are those for which the address of the first inventor was in Israel, regardless of the identity and location of the assignees or of the other inventors, and similarly for the other countries. The important question now is, who actually owns the rights to these inventions? Keeping in mind that for patents labeled "israeli" it was indeed israeli scientists and engineers that were responsible for the "innovative act" that led to these patents (they certainly provided the "brain power"), 15, 16 the question is: which entity, commercial or otherwise, is in a position to reap the economic benefits from these inventions?
At the upper level of aggregation there are 3 possibilities: ( i) That there is no assignee (i.e. the i nventor herself retains the rights to the patent), and hence it is not clear if and when the patent will be commercially exploited; (ii) that the assignee is also israeli, that is, that the location of the entity owning the rights to the patent is in Israel; (iii) that the assignee is foreign. Even the seemingly sharp distinction between (ii) and (iii) is not quite as clear. There are on the one hand israeli corporations that have established subsidiaries or otherwise related firms in other countries, and they may choose to assign the patents (done is Israel) to their "foreign" subsidiaries (but in fact we should regard them as israeli). On the other hand, there are multinational corporations that have established subsidiaries in Israel, and some may choose to assign the locally produced patents to the israeli subsidiary, even though the multinational retains effective control over the property rights. We have dealt as well as we could with the first difficulty, by examining the names of the assignees, and spotting those cases that were designated as foreign assignees but were clearly israeli firms (e.g. Elscint US, Ormat, etc.). By contrast we have not addressed the second difficulty, but rather taken on face value the address of the assignee, e.g. Motorola Hertzlia will appear as an israeli assignee, Motorola US as a foreign assignee.
The distinction between these 3 categories, unassigned, israeli ("local") and foreign, is then telling of the extent to which the country can expect to benefit from "its"
patents. The unassigned patents may of course find their way to successful commercial applications (and many do), but they typically face much higher uncertainty than corporate assignees that own from the start the patents issued to their employees.
Moreover, corporations are in a better position to capture internally the spillovers generated by those innovations. Thus, the higher is the percentage of unassigned patents, the less would be the economic potential of a given stock of patents. The distinction between foreign and local assignees is presumably informative of the probability that the local economy would be the prime beneficiary of the new knowledge embedded in the patent. One can draw various scenarios whereby foreign ownership may be as good if not better in that respect than local ownership of the patent rights (e.g. the foreign multinational offers marketing channels for the innovation that would be inaccessible to local firms). Still, we are rapidly moving in many technological areas to an era where the prime asset is the effective control of intellectual property, and presumably that is correlated with the ownership of patent rights. However, we do not need to take a strong stand in this respect, only to agree that this distinction is informative and quite likely important for understanding the potential value for a country of its stock of patents.
A further distinction for assigned patents, whether israeli or foreign, is according to the "type" of assignee, and in this context we consider 3 main categories (although we have made actually finer distinction in the data): corporate, government and universities (including hospitals and related research institutions). The working hypothesis is that the likelihood of down-the-line commercial application of a patent would be higher if owned by a corporation, and lower if owned by the Government or by Universities. Figure 10 shows the distribution of israeli patents among different types of assignees for the whole period, at the two levels of aggregation. Just slightly over half of the total number of patents received during the past 30 years is owned by designated israeli assignees. Almost a third are unassigned, and the remaining 17% belong to foreign assignees. Of the 53% owned by israeli assignees, a full third went to Israeli Universities and to the Israeli Government, the latter mostly to Defense-related institutions (primarily to "Rafael" and to "Taas", the Military Industry). Thus, the percentage of all israeli patents that belong to israeli corporate assignees is just over a third: 0.53x0.67=0.355. This percentage is very low by any standard (see below): it implies that only a third of all patents generated by israeli inventors have a relatively high chance to bring in economic benefits to the israeli economy. To repeat, this is only a probabilistic statement: for sure many of the patents granted to Universities, to Rafael, or to private individuals eventually resulted (or will result in the future) in commercially successful innovations for israeli firms. Still, unassigned patents, patents granted to foreign assignees, or to Universities and the Government presumably offer lower expected local returns than those assigned to israeli corporations.
[Figure 10 -about here]
The following Figure 10 , that is, the distribution between unassigned, "local" and foreign assignees. 17 As we can see, the percentage of local assignees is much lower than that of all G7 countries except for Canada. As to the reference group, Finland has a much higher share of local assignees than Israel, the other 3 (with few patents each) have lower percentages. In the case of the Asian Tigers, the two large patent holders stand at opposite extremes: Taiwan has a very low percentage of local assignees (due to an extremely high share of unassigned, 64%!), whereas South Korea h as an extremely high share (topped only by Japan). These differences are clearly related to the industrial organization of these countries (e.g. Taiwan has a very large number of small enterprises, and an extremely high rate of turnover of firms, whereas South Korea is dominated by huge, stable chaebol), but it is a topic worth of further investigation. The contrast between the latest figures (for 1998) and those for the whole period 1976-98 reveal that the G7 countries are quite stable, whereas most of the others increased the share of local assignees, some of them very significantly such as Taiwan, Singapore, New Zealand and Spain. Thus, the world-wide trend is towards an increase in the share of local assignees. What characterizes Israel vis a vis other countries is that both the shares of unassigned and of foreign are relatively high (the only other countries for which that is true are all minor players: New Zealand, Spain and Hong Kong).
[ 1968-1986 2 1987-1989 6 1990-1991 18 1992-1993 36 1994-1995 70 Thus, the number of israeli patents taken by these corporations grew extremely fast, from less than 10 prior to 1990 to about 70 in the mid 1990's, whereas in the course of the same period the overall number of israeli patents barely doubled.
As already suggested, we have to be very careful in how to judge this phenomenon. On the one hand the fact that these multinationals have established a foothold in Israel is extremely important in terms of the (positive) externalities that they generate, as well as in opening foreign markets for israeli technology. On the other hand they may be competing for the one key resource that Israel has, namely, innovative talent in cutting edge technologies (see below). It is this talent that they seek in opening R&D labs in Israel, and in so doing they acquire control over the intellectual property generated there. Whatever the normative stand that one takes on this issue, it is imperative to know well the facts, and this is what we have attempted here.
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Trends in the distribution of assignees
So far we have looked at the distribution o f assignees for the whole stock of israeli patents of the past 30 years, and the picture is rather bleak; however, the picture brightens significantly when we examine time trends. Figure 11 shows the distribution over time of the unassigned-local-foreign p ercentages: there is a slow increase in the share of israeli assignees, approaching now 60% (from about 45% in the 1970's), a marked decline in the share of unassigned (from about 40% in the 1970s to 20% in the mid 1990's), but also a significant increase in the share of foreign patents from about 10% in the 1980s to over 20% in the 1990s. The sharp and persistent decline in the share of unassigned patents (we are now in that respect at the level of the USA) is certainly very good news; the remaining (and still open) question is how to relate to the increase in the share of foreign assignees.
[ Figure 11 -about here] Figure 12 displays the distribution of israeli assignees among the various types:
corporate, universities, and government. Here the main trends are very encouraging: the share of corporate-own patents has risen steadily from a low of 30% at the beginning of the period, to a high of 83% in 1997. This rise came mostly from the corresponding dramatic drop in the share of universities: from a high of about half of all patents at first, to 12% if 1997. The share of government patents has fluctuated quite a bit around the 10% mark, but seems to be decreasing steadily as of the early 1990s (to 6% in 1997).
Still, a total of 18% for Government and Universities combined is very high compared to all other countries, and we expect that this percentage will continue to shrink to internationally-acceptable levels of less than 10%.
[ Figure 12 -about here] Figure 13 summarizes these trends into one figure, the share of israeli corporate patents out of the total number of israeli patents. As already suggested, these are the patents with the highest expected payoff for the israeli economy, and hence the focus on them. Once again, the overall trend here is certainly encouraging: israeli corporate patents accounted for a dismal 15% at the beginning of the period, and now account for almost half (48%) of all israeli patents. As we can see, the rise was not smooth, and actually throughout the 1980s it hovered around the 35% mark. It is only since 1992 that it has climbed steadily up to today's level. Of course, there is still a very long way to go: in order to take full advantage of the potential embedded in israeli inventions to the benefit of the israeli economy, this percentage would have to increase steadily (to, say, the 70-80% mark). That would require a continuous reshuffling of inventive resources, away from all other competing players and towards the israeli corporate sector.
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[ Figure 13 -about here]
Competing for talent?
As already suggested, the identity of the assignees may be informative not only of who owns what, but of who competes for the limited pool of skills, scientific and technological talent and entrepreneurial drive that Israel has. One way to approach this issue is through the information displayed in Figure 14 , that is, the distribution of patents by technological categories, for each type of assignee. Thus, foreign and israeli corporations look quite similar in that respect, except that foreign assignees are much more active than israelis in Computers and Communications (the share of foreigners in that field is 33%, versus 15% for israeli assignees). By contrast, both Universities and individual inventors operate in rather different technological areas than corporations:
Universities primarily in Chemistry and Drugs and Medicine, individual inventors in Mechanical and "Other". In short, foreign and local corporations do seem to compete for the same sort of human capital, universities and individual inventors do not.
[ Figure 14 -about here]
VII. The Relative "Importance" of Israeli Patents
Simple patent counts are a very imperfect measure of innovative activity, simply because patents vary a great deal in their technological and economic "importance" or "value", and the distribution of such values is extremely skewed. Recent research has shown that patent citations can effectively play the role of proxies for the "importance" of patents, as well as providing a way of tracing spillovers (see Trajtenberg, 1990 , Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1996 , and Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1998 . By citations we mean the references to previous patents that appear in the front page of each patent (see Figure   1 ). 19 We do not see so far such reshuffling in the distribution of R&D expenditures by sector -see CBS (1998), table 1.
Patent citations serve an important legal function, since they delimit the scope of the property rights awarded by the patent. Thus, if patent 2 cites patent 1, it implies that patent 1 represents a piece of previously existing knowledge upon which patent 2 builds, and over which 2 cannot have a claim. The applicant has a legal duty to disclose any knowledge of the prior art, but the decision regarding which patents to cite ultimately rests with the patent examiner, who is supposed to be an expert in the area and hence to be able to identify relevant prior art that the applicant misses or conceals.
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We use data on patent citations here in order to examine the "quality" of Israeli patents vis a vis US patents, and patents of the reference group of countries. That is, we ask to what extent israeli patents are more or less frequently cited than the patents of these other countries, controlling for various effects. Moreover, we analyze how these differences vary over technological categories, and over time. We regress the number of citations received by each patent (ncites), on control variables (dummies for 5 technological classes as well as for grant years), a dummy for the US and another for the group of reference countries. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients of these two latter dummies are telling of the extent to which israeli patents receive more or less citations on average than these other countries, controlling for technological composition and age of patents. The results for the benchmark regression are as follows:
Number of obs = 37313 F( 7, 37272) = 196.21 Prob > F = 0.0000 R-squared = 0.1330 Adj R-squared = 0.1321 Root MSE = 5.0211 Thus, US patents are "better" than israeli patents by about 25% (the coefficient of 0.695 for the US divided by the constant term of 2.98), but israeli patents are of significantly better quality than the patents of the reference countries. Next we ask what happened to these differences over time, that is, are israeli patents getting better or worse relative to other countries? Just interacting the coefficients of interest in the above regression with time won't do, because as time advances (i.e. as we get closer to the present, which necessarily truncates future citations) the number of citations received declines. One way to go about it is to define the dependent variable in logs, which in principle should be immune to truncation (since the coefficients on the dummies for countries are in percentage terms). 21 In the following regressions we compare in that fashion the relative standing of israeli patents in the last 10 years versus the previous 20 years (dummies for tech categories are included in both but not shown):
grant year<1986
Number of obs = 20287 F( 7, 20257) = 54.69 Prob > F = 0.0000 R-squared = 0.0859 Adj R-squared = 0.0846 
Grant year > 1986
Number of obs = 17026 F( 7, 17008) = 128.21 Thus, whereas in the pre-1986 period US patents were about 19% better than israeli patents, in the post-1986 period that advantage seems to have decreased slightly (to 17%). The relative standing of israeli patents vis a vis the reference group of countries did not change. We also run similar regressions for the whole period whereby time is interacted with the dummies for t he US and reference countries, and the results are pretty much the same, except that their significance is rather fragile. 22 In any case, it is quite clear that the converse is not true, that is, one can easily reject the null hypothesis that the quality of israeli patents has declined over time, in the wake of the rapid growth in their numbers.
In Figure 15 we show graphically the results of the analysis for each technological class. The columns represent the value of the respective dummies, e.g. the coefficient of the USA dummy in a (separate) regression just for Drugs and Medicine was 1.01, whereas the coefficient of the reference group dummy in that same regression was -1.06, and so forth. 23 Thus, israeli patents are particularly good in Computers and
Communications (in that category we are on par with the US, and much better than the reference countries), whereas the biggest disadvantage vis a vis the US resides in Drugs and Medical.
[ In Figure 16 we look into Drugs and Medical in more detail, and the picture that emerges is as follows. We stand at a large disadvantage vis a vis the US both in Surgery Israeli patents and Industrial R&D expenditures in Israel. Moreover, the time path of patents seems to have been strongly influenced by major "supply shocks" such as the termination of the project to build a jet fighter (which freed a large number of engineers and technicians), and the mass immigration from the former Soviet Union. This raises the question of whether such the rapid growth in innovative outputs is sustainable, given the recent stagnation (and even cuts) in Government support to R&D, and the lack of significant foreseeable additions to the pool of highly skilled workers.
Israel fares very well in international comparisons (vis a vis the G7, a Reference
Group of countries with similar GDP per capita, and the "Asian Tigers"), both in terms of patents per capita, and in growth rates of patenting. Thus, in recent years it holds third place among these countries in patents per capita (after the US and Japan), and third again for growth rates (after Taiwan and South Korea). However, many aspects of the innovation process require a "critical mass", and for those purposes i t is the absolute size of the innovative sector that counts, as proxied here by the (absolute) number of patents.
Israel has still a long way to go in those terms: it stands well below all of the G7 countries, and is about ¼ the size of Taiwan and South Korea. Once again, the question is whether there are forces in the Israeli economy capable of keeping the momentum going for the High Tech sector, bringing it up to the size required to ensure its long-term viability. This remains to be seen. 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 Corp Gov Unv 
